pElAgUS' 

A Movement Toward a Movement for Animal Rights?

by Roger Yates

Social movements have been described as ‘claims-making’ enterprises.  Most obviously, social movements make claims about issues that concern them: often they seek to identify something they consider to be a problem and declare that ‘something should be done’ about it.

Here is an example of some animal rights claims-making from London-based Rights for Animals made in 2004:

Rights for Animals condemns the seal hunt, not because the hunted animals are “cute and furry”, but because they can suffer and feel joy. Killing puppies is not something unacceptable because it is “cruel”, but because it is based on an unjustifiable discrimination: speciesism. This is also why we condemn all forms of animal utilisation - while seal hunting is one of the issues that has received more attention, billions of animals suffer other forms of exploitation; for food production, in experiments or for entertainment. We hope to see an end to this and we strive to make the world a better place for all.

Actually, claims such as these, which are based on highlighting interconnections between ‘different’ modes of exploitation of both nonhuman and human animals[1]  are uncommon in present-day advocacy.  More to the point, these sorts of ‘holistic’ claims are even quite rare within the modern mobilisation that calls itself the ‘animal rights movement’.  Ask American lawyer and animal rights philosopher Gary Francione why this should be, and he will state quite candidly that no North American or British animal rights movement exists.  Sure, there is a movement that goes under the name, but very few advocates for nonhuman animals presently articulate philosophical animal rights positions[2] in their claims, and certainly not as the mainstay of their claims.

As Rights for Animals imply, a number of campaigners will make claims on behalf of nonhumans on the basis that they are ‘cute’ (this may apply just as much to laboratory kittens and puppies as to baby seals).  However, by far the commonest claim in nonhuman animal advocacy is that this or that practice is ‘cruel’.  Both claims are essentially animal welfare claims in the main, but they are not of the same sort – or do not have to be.  The conventional strategy to &lsquooint to cute’ is typical in a traditional welfarist frame of reference, whereas the ‘cruel’ frame is found in all forms of animal welfarism, from the largely orthodox RSPCA-type organisations to more radical or ‘abolitionist welfare’ groups such as Compassion In World Farming (CIWF). 

The majority of claims made under the label ‘animal rights’ tend also to concentrate on the issue of ‘cruelty’ and imply - while CIWF openly asserts - that some form of ‘non-cruel’ or ‘humane’ ‘use’ may be feasible.  However, there is ambiguity in terms of this point, for many campaigners appear to believe, alternatively, that bringing about ‘non-cruel’ systems of nonhuman utilisation is practically impossible or, at least, would be extremely difficult and therefore unlikely to be achieved (with an exception in the case of pet use).  As a consequence, for many, ending ‘cruelty’ amounts to abolition of use without actually saying it.

To help understand much of the above, it is beneficial to make use of a concept employed in social movement theory known as frame alignment.  All experienced campaigners will appreciate what this idea is driving at, even those who, in the main, limit their activism to writing letters to the mass media.  The idea is simple yet quite far-reaching, as it suggests that some campaign claims are easier to make (or ‘sell&rsquo than others.  This depends principally on the frames of reference being used in claims-making.  Generally speaking, employing widely-accepted and existing frames, such as ‘caring for the environment’, ‘human rights’, or those often used in scientific anti-vivisectionism – ‘humans will suffer’, is easier than having to convince audiences that new frames are valid and worthy of attention.  New frames can be challenging in terms of accepting them, such as this ‘weird’ idea that nonhuman animals are rightholders.  Clearly, successfully aligning campaigning claims with already existing societal understandings is much better - in the sense of much simpler - than basing claims on far more ambitious and on what many may think are bizarre ideas.  If a novel, radical frame is employed, then often as not, just as much time must be expended explaining and justifying the frame itself as is spent on expanding on substantive ideas about social changes that flow from its moral logic.

Given this, it is not rocket science to understand that most claims about human-nonhuman relations are framed in orthodox welfarist ‘cruelty’ premises using ideas that most of the public are aware of and, indeed, have expressed support for in the majority.  On the other hand, using a new frame such as ‘animal rights’ – and meaning it – is not the most straightforward strategy.  What Gary Francione appears to have assumed – and wrongly it seems - is that many people who use the term ‘animal rights’ are in some sense fairly committed to the philosophy behind it.  He seems to have thought that he simply had to point out that most self-labelling animal rightists are really animal welfarists of some variety (not forgetting that many nonhuman advocates may base their claims on ideas other than rights or welfare).  Consequently, they would almost automatically seek to adjust their claims to genuine animal rights ones, or keenly embrace classification as welfarist.

Patently this was not the case.  Many nonhuman protectionists ardently disavow both human rights and animal rights as a good or axial means of talking about human-nonhuman relations; and many - for entirely understandable reasons - will always take easy options in terms of available claims to be made.  Others may say they are animal rightists really but routinely utilise welfare language ‘tactically’, rather in line with the reasoning of frame alignment; and many say animal welfare and animal rights are the ‘same thing anyway’, and ask what all the fuss is about.

So – why discuss any of this? 

In essence, this is of a plea to members of the animal protection movement.  Given that there are campaigners who wish to take an animal rights stance in their core claims about prevailing human-nonhuman relations, why not let them have the ‘animal rights’ name?  There are plenty of names!  Animal Lib, Animal Concern, Animal Aid, Animal Protection, even – of course - Radical Animal Welfarism.

Isn’t there a place in ‘the movement’ for genuine animal rights claims such as the one above?  And isn’t it right that those who make such holistic animal rights claims should be the only ones identified as animal rightists?  While there are obvious commonalities, few pretend that every person – or every organisation – in the animal protection movement stands for the same thing.  Some merely want to end (subsets of) blood sports, others oppose intensive but not extensive ‘animal agriculture’, many passionate anti-vivisectionists no doubt eat meat, and there are probably more vegetarians than vegans in the movement’s ranks.  Some will oppose all and every human ‘use’ of nonhumans but simply do not believe in rights.  Why, then, use the rights label?  Clearly, advocates’ claims are based on a variety of different principles.  Many anti-vivisectionists seem content with that as their title, or would make reference to nonhuman experimentation, and many anti-blood sports campaigners have not taken the animal rights name.  Perhaps it is not asking much that all non-rightists forego its use?

Unlike Francione, I have never believed that the welfarist majority – or any other non-rights grouping in the animal movement - is about to convert to core philosophical animal rights perspectives.  Many will remain committed to fighting ‘cruelty’ and only a few will be happier talking as a matter of course about nonhuman others being rights bearers while describing what routinely happens to them as rights violations caused by humans who disrespect nonhuman rights.  This reluctance, as suggested above, will be ‘tactical’ or otherwise.

Why not, finally, simply allow the rightists the name ‘animal rights’?  This may take a deal of time, of course, because often as not the mistakes are made by the mass media and (ideologically) by countermovements.  Ideally, to kick-start a process of change, movement non-rightists would begin to correct journalists and others who mislabel as rights-based their own position on human-nonhuman relations.  Would we not expect an advocate to object to being mislabelled?  To be sure, this act of correction is not always possible – and the pro-use countermovements have their own reasons for being difficult, as in insisting that Australian bio-ethicist Peter Singer is an animal rights philosopher.  However, over time, perhaps it will come to pass that a distinct position known as Animal Rights will be established free of welfarist baggage. 

Thereupon, animal rights’ particular perspectives on human-nonhuman relations could be clearly differentiated from other positions which, although they are also concerned with human-nonhuman relations, are simply not the same.  There are important differences to mark, some are subtle, some not so!  Plainly, non-rightists do not always want what animal rights advocates want.  If one disagrees with what a philosophy wants, why want its name?  Many advocates, for example, argue that the human practice of keeping captive pets is consistent with a moral view of human-nonhuman relations – the rights view would reject this notion.  If you are an advocate who believes pet keeping is morally acceptable, then you can easily distinguish yourself from animal rights thought that tends to view keeping a nonhuman captive as akin to slave-keeping.  Distinction would result in the animal protection movement being able to present to the public a whole spectrum of positions on the human treatment of nonhumans. 

Those who wish to explore the distinctive character of animal rights claims should consult the major writings of animal rights theorists such as (in order of radicalism) Joan Dunayer (including her controversial assertion that insects have rights), Gary Francione (argues for one basic right, the right not to be human property) and Tom Regan (whose case for animal rights is built upon the concept that nonhuman individuals are somebodies, not somethings and are ‘subjects-of-a-life&rsquo. 

End Notes

1. Movements such as ecofeminism and people like first wave animal rightist and campaigner for social reforms, Henry Salt, make direct connections from the oppression of animals, which is learned in childhood through cultural and family traditions, to the oppression of humans (racism, sexism). back

2. Some argue that we can sensible make a distinction between &lsquohilosophical animal rights’ and ‘everyday animal rights’.  I agree.  However, the point is this: the latter distorts the former and, because of that, it would be helpful if the latter was known by its correct labels - radical animal welfarism or animal liberationism (meaning a form such as Peter Singer’s version of utilitarian animal welfarism, not the ALF’s liberation position).  Of course, there is a difficult but rather fundamental issue embedded in this: who says what ‘animal rights’ is?