by Alexandra Giese

From the Arctic sea ice to the Antarctic interior and the mountainous peaks of Peru, Alaska, and Tibet, ice is melting at an alarming rate. The accelerating loss of ice sheets, sea ice, and glaciers is one of the most powerful and striking indicators of a warming climate.

The most notable ice loss in recent years has been the shrinking of sea ice in the Arctic Ocean. From the beginning of the satellite record in 1979 through 1996, ice area decreased at a steady rate of 3 percent per decade in response to rising temperature. In the following decade, ice area decreased by 11 percent, reaching a dramatic minimum in 2007. In September of that year, sea ice occupied only 3.6 million square kilometers, an area 27 percent smaller than the previous record low (in 2005) and 38 percent smaller than the 1979–2007 average. Summer sea ice coverage has increased slightly in the last two years, but it is still far below the long-term average.




Declines in ice thickness and volume are just as dramatic. The combination of these trends has led to a decrease in the amount of ice that persists in the Arctic through multiple seasons. Multiyear ice is more stable and less susceptible to break-up than the thin, short-lived seasonal ice that forms each winter. Between 1987 and 2007, the amount of ice at least five years old has plummeted from 57 to just 7 percent. Drastic changes in sea ice cover have led scientists from the University of Washington and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to predict that the summer of 2037 could see the first ice-free Arctic in a million years. Other scientists have predicted a largely ice-free summertime Arctic as early as 2015.

Declining sea ice is a self-reinforcing trend because of what is known as the albedo effect. Ice reflects up to 70 percent of the sunlight that reaches it, while ocean water reflects only 6 percent and absorbs the rest as heat. This means that as soon as a small amount of sea ice disappears and exposes the underlying ocean water, the system starts absorbing more energy, which leads to further ice melt. Dangers associated with this runaway warming scenario include rapid destruction of diverse ecosystems that support polar bears, seals, and walruses, among other organisms; a thawing of the Arctic tundra, which can release copious amounts of the greenhouse gas methane; and increased warming of nearby Greenland.

Satellite data indicate that the Greenland ice sheet has been experiencing accelerated melt, particularly over the past several decades. In fact, Greenland’s average annual melt between 2002 and 2005 was triple that of the 1997-2003 period, and the summer melt area on the ice sheet has increased 30 percent since 1979. In recent years, changes in ice dynamics associated with higher temperatures have caused glaciers to flow faster, leading to additional ice loss. Melt water lubricates the base of glaciers that carry ice from the interior to the sea, causing their movement to accelerate (for example, the speed of Greenland’s largest outlet glacier doubled in just five years). Surface lakes propagate fractures through the ice sheet as they drain, further lubricating the base and weakening the ice sheet with a network of cracks. And glaciers have been calving into the ocean with enough force to be detected on seismometers all over the world. The frequency of these “glacial earthquakes” has increased in recent years; in 2005, for example, there were over twice as many quakes as in any year before 2002. All told, Greenland lost 1,500 gigatons of ice between 2000 and 2008, more water than is used in U.S. homes and industry over a six-year period.

In the Southern Hemisphere, Antarctica, too, is showing signs of a warming climate. Annual ice mass loss for the entire continent more than doubled between the periods 2002–06 and 2006–09. In March 2009, a 400-square-kilometer piece of ice broke off of the Wilkins ice shelf, the tenth ice shelf collapse on the Antarctic Peninsula in recent times. The most notable break-up was that of the Larsen B ice shelf in 2002, which covered some 3,000 square kilometers, roughly the size of Rhode Island. The West Antarctic ice sheet (WAIS ) lost 59 percent more ice in 2006 than it did in 1996. A fast-flowing drainage glacier of WAIS, the Pine Island glacier, experienced a quadrupling in its average rate of volume loss between 1995 and 2006. Previously well-established as stable or even gaining mass, the East Antarctic ice sheet may in fact be shrinking. A late 2009 Nature Geoscience study points toward a net melting of the ice sheet since 2006. This new discovery adds to the ever-growing fears of ice sheet collapse and sea level rise. With increased melting, scientists say sea level could rise as much as 2 meters by the end of this century.

Mountain glaciers are much smaller in comparison to the polar ice sheets and, thus, do not pose nearly as great a threat to world sea levels. But due to their proximity and importance to human settlements, their melting is of grave and immediate concern. Melting mountain glaciers can create hazards like rockfalls, avalanches, and outburst floods from glacial lakes; they also have significant impacts on freshwater supplies. Worldwide, the average annual rate of mountain glacier melt was over twice as great between 1996 and 2005 as during the previous decade. The World Glacier Monitoring Service named 2007, the most recent year for which data are available, the eighteenth consecutive year of retreat for the 30 reference glaciers measured since 1976.

The glaciers in the Himalayas and on the Tibetan plateau make up the largest body of ice outside the poles and provide water to Asia’s major river systems, which supply water to over 2 billion people. This water is vital for drinking and for irrigating the wheat and rice crops in China and India, the largest in the world. In recent years, Himalayan glaciers have been retreating at rates ranging from 10 to 60 meters per year. As the glaciers disappear, the dry-season flows of river systems that depend on them may decrease by up to 70 percent, making them seasonal rivers. River systems at risk include the Yangtze, Yellow, Indus, Ganges, and Brahmaputra.

The Andes, home to 90 percent of the world’s tropical glaciers, are also experiencing rapid melt and a shrinking water supply: between the early 1970s and 2006, Peruvian and Bolivian glaciers lost about one third of their surface area. In Peru, glacier and snow melt provides 80 percent of the fresh water, used not only for drinking but also for hydroelectricity, which supplies more than 80 percent of the country’s power. In neighboring Bolivia, the La Paz governor is already anticipating severe water shortages and considering a program for migration out of the capital city. The 18,000-year-old Chacaltaya glacier, home of the country’s only ski resort, disappeared in 2009.

The glaciers of Tanzania’s Mount Kilimanjaro, long cultural and spiritual icons, decreased in area by 84 percent between 1912 and 2007 and continue to melt rapidly. In Alaska, 98 percent of glaciers are currently thinning or retreating. And accelerated melting puts Montana’s Glacier National Park on track to lose its namesakes by 2020. (See map and additional examples at www.earthpolicy.org/index.php?/indicators/C50/ice_melting_2009.)

These current ice loss trends are alarming, but perhaps more disconcerting is the fact that ice melt is occurring even faster than scientific models have predicted, emphasizing the need to cut emissions before the world sees ice sheet collapse, catastrophic inundation of low-lying coastal areas, and widespread water and food shortages. After all, in the words of Stockholm University professor Johan Rockström, “We don’t know how to refreeze the Greenland ice sheet.”

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Data and additional resources at www.earthpolicy.org.


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Lester R. Brown

http://www.earthpolicy.org/index.php?/book_bytes/2009/pb4ch0_pref

Note: the following was written in July 2009, before the Copenhagen climate change conference.

From my pre-Copenhagen vantage point, internationally negotiated climate agreements are fast becoming obsolete for two reasons. First, since no government wants to concede too much compared with other governments, the negotiated goals for cutting carbon emissions will almost certainly be minimalist, not remotely approaching the bold cuts that are needed.

And second, since it takes years to negotiate and ratify these agreements, we may simply run out of time. This is not to say that we should not participate in the negotiations and work hard to get the best possible result. But we should not rely on these agreements to save civilization.

Some of the most impressive climate stabilization advances, such as the powerful U.S. grassroots movement that has led to a de facto moratorium on new coal-fired power plants, had little to do with international negotiations. At no point did the leaders of this movement say that they wanted to ban new coal-fired power plants only if Europe does, if China does, or if the rest of the world does. They moved ahead unilaterally knowing that if the United States does not quickly cut carbon emissions, the world will be in trouble.

We are in a race between political tipping points and natural tipping points. Can we cut carbon emissions fast enough to save the Greenland ice sheet and avoid the resulting rise in sea level? Can we close coal-fired power plants fast enough to save the glaciers in the Himalayas and on the Tibetan Plateau, the ice melt of which sustains the major rivers and irrigation systems of Asia during the dry season? Can we stabilize population by reducing fertility before nature takes over and stabilizes our numbers by raising mortality?

On the climate front, everything seems to be moving faster. Only a few years ago summer sea ice in the Arctic Ocean was shrinking, but it was projected to last for several decades. The most recent reports indicate that it could disappear in a matter of years.

Only a few years have passed since the most recent report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), but already the rise in carbon dioxide emissions, the rise in temperature, and the rise in sea level are all moving faster than even the IPCC’s worst-case scenario.

The good news is that the shift to renewable energy is occurring at a rate and on a scale that we could not imagine even two years ago. Consider what is happening in Texas, in the heart of oil country. The over 8,000 megawatts of wind generating capacity in operation, the 1,000 megawatts under construction, and a huge amount in development will give it over 50,000 megawatts of wind generating capacity (think 50 coal-fired power plants).  This will more than satisfy the residential needs of the state’s 24 million people.

China, with its Wind Base program, is working on seven wind farm mega-complexes with a total generating capacity of 110,000 megawatts. And this is in addition to the many smaller wind farms already in operation and under construction. A recent report in Science on an inventory of China’s wind resources concludes that the country can increase its current electricity generation sevenfold from wind alone.

Most recently, a consortium of European corporations and investment banks has announced a proposal to develop a massive amount of solar thermal generating capacity in North Africa, much of it for export to Europe. In total, it could easily exceed 300,000 megawatts—roughly three times the electrical generating capacity of France.

And we could cite many more examples. The energy transition from fossil fuels to renewable sources of energy is moving much faster than most people realize. In the United States, for example, while coal use has dropped 11 percent over the last two years, an estimated 190 new wind farms with over 16,000 megawatts of generating capacity have come online.

The question we face is not what we need to do, because that seems rather clear to those who are analyzing the global situation. The challenge is how to do it in the time available. Unfortunately we don’t know how much time remains. Nature is the timekeeper but we cannot see the clock.

In my recent book, Plan B 4.0: Mobilizing to Save Civilization, I lay out a strategy to stabilize climate, curb population growth, eradicate poverty, and restore the earth’s damaged ecosystems. The climate component of that plan calls for reducing net carbon emissions worldwide 80 percent by 2020. The 2020 goal looks at what is needed to avert dangerous climate change, not just what is politically convenient. Plan B is ambitious simply because this is what it is going to take to turn things around. Will it be difficult? No question. Are the stakes high? No question.

The thinking that got us into this mess is not likely to get us out. We need a new mindset. Let me paraphrase a comment by environmentalist Paul Hawken in a 2009 college commencement address. In recognizing the enormity of the challenge facing us, he said: First we need to decide what needs to be done. Then we do it. And then we ask if it is possible.

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Adapted from the preface of Plan B 4.0: Mobilizing to Save Civilization by Lester R. Brown
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009), available on-line at www.earthpolicy.org/index.php?/books/pb4

Additional data and information sources at www.earthpolicy.org

In Chapter 1 of Plan B 4.0: Mobilizing to Save Civilization, Lester Brown underscores important indicators of global stability and resource consumption.  The following are summaries of key datasets that inform these discussions.

Each year, the Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy magazine rank 60 “failing states,” countries which on some level fail to provide personal security or basic services, such as education, health care, food, and physical infrastructure, to their people.  The countries are evaluated using the Failed States Index, a ten-point scale for each of twelve political, social, economic, and military indicators (i.e., a state that is failing completely receives a score of 120). 





Failing states have much in common.  Seventeen of the top twenty have high population growth rates (several close to 3 percent per year or twenty-fold per century); these countries have seen enough development to reduce mortality but not fertility.  In fact, birth rates in five of these seventeen states exceed six children per woman.  Soaring population growth puts strain on educational facilities, as well as food and water supplies.  It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that almost half of the top twenty failing states depend on food from the UN World Food Programme or that in fourteen of them, at least 40 percent of the population is under fifteen.

As breeding grounds for conflict, terrorism, drugs, and infectious disease, failing states represent a threat to global order and stability.  In 2004, only seven countries had scores of 100 or greater.  In just four years, the number of states in this category doubled.

Another concern addressed in Plan B 4.0 is how the growing consumption of the earth’s resources is clearly unsustainable.  Examining commodity consumption in merely two countries, the United States and China, makes this point.

China now consumes more grain than the United States.  It consumes almost twice as much meat, roughly three times as much coal, and nearly four times as much steel.  But what would happen if China’s 1.3 billion people were to consume commodities at the same rate as the United States’ 300 million?

For this exercise, we look at how an eight percent annual economic growth rate in China (a conservative projection) would put per capita income in China at U.S. levels by 2024. 

At that point, if each person in China were to consume paper at the current American rate, China would need more paper than is produced worldwide today (there go the world’s forests).  China would require over half of the current world grain supply. China would also need 90 million barrels of oil per day; however, the world currently produces less than 86 million and is unlikely to produce much more than that in the future.





These projections serve not to blame China for its consumption but rather to illustrate that the western economic model—with meat-rich diets, fossil-fuel powered utilities, and automobile-dependent transportation—will not work on a global scale because there are simply not enough resources.  Plan B puts us on a path toward new kind of global economy, one that is powered largely by renewable sources of energy, that has a much more diversified transport system, and that reuses and recycles everything.

Go to www.earthpolicy.org/index.php?/books/pb4/pb4_data to see more data and learn about Lester Brown’s Plan B for saving civilization.

J. Matthew Roney

Leadership of the global wind market is about to change hands. The United States—the birthplace of the modern wind industry—has held the top spot in new installations since 2005, growing at 50 percent a year and adding a record 8,540 megawatts of wind generating capacity in 2008. But if the credit-crunched U.S. industry adds only 8,000 megawatts in 2009, as anticipated, China’s new installations of some 10,000 megawatts will make it the world leader in annual additions. Having doubled its installed capacity in each of the last five years, this relative newcomer is now poised to dominate the wind energy industry for years to come.



Nowhere is China’s bid for wind supremacy more evident than in its new Wind Base program. In 2008, the National Energy Administration selected six wind-rich locations as sites for wind mega-complexes of between 10,000 and 30,000 megawatts each. A seventh has since been added to the list. In August 2009 construction began on the first project, a 13,000-megawatt complex in the northwestern province of Gansu. When completed, these Wind Bases will total more than 110,000 megawatts of capacity, the generating equivalent of 110 coal-fired power plants.

The emergence of China as the new world wind market leader in 2009 follows an extraordinary 2008, the latest year for which complete data are available. World wind generating capacity grew 29 percent, adding a record 27,000 megawatts to reach 121,000 megawatts installed worldwide, enough to satisfy the residential electricity needs of nearly 200 million people.

In 2008 the United States’ addition of more than 8,500 megawatts brought its total capacity to 25,400 megawatts. This allowed the United States to reclaim the top spot in overall capacity after being second to Germany since 1997. China ranked second in new capacity added with 6,300 megawatts and moved into fourth place in terms of total capacity. Rounding out the top five countries in new additions were India with 1,800 megawatts, Germany with 1,660, and Spain with 1,610. (See data at www.earthpolicy.org/index.php?/indicators/C49).

Europe, by far the leading region in cumulative wind capacity, added 8,800 megawatts in 2008. Traditionally, Germany, Spain, and Denmark—respectively getting 7, 12, and 21 percent of their electricity from wind—have been the only major players in European wind development. But the market is quickly becoming more diverse, with Italy, France, and the United Kingdom leading a “second wave” of wind expansion. With their help, wind was the leading source of new power added in the European Union in 2008.

Wind accounted for 42 percent of new electricity generating capacity from all sources in the United States in 2008, second only to natural gas for the fourth year running. Texas leads all states in total capacity; as of late 2009, it has almost 9,000 megawatts installed, nearly triple the capacity of second-place Iowa. If Texas were a country, it would be sixth on the list of world wind leaders.

Thirty-six states now have utility-scale wind farms. In west Texas, the German energy firm E.ON recently completed a 780-megawatt wind farm, the world’s largest. But this may soon be dwarfed by even bigger projects already in development. These include a 2,000-megawatt wind farm planned for Carbon County, Wyoming, and the aptly named Titan Wind Farm, a 5,050-megawatt project whose first phase is now under construction in South Dakota.

Now that China has overtaken the United States in annual additions, its explosive development will soon catapult it into the lead in cumulative installed capacity. China had fewer than 800 megawatts of wind power as of 2004, but it has grown an impressive fifteenfold since, reaching 12,200 megawatts at the end of 2008. But this is just the beginning of what is possible—a 2009 study in the journal Science reports that China’s onshore wind resources are enough to meet its current electricity needs seven times over.

The world’s offshore wind potential is vast as well, but efforts to harness it have trailed far behind those of land-based wind development. Just 2,100 megawatts have been installed, and all are in the waters off 10 European countries, China, and Japan. Still, the pace is picking up: more than half of this capacity was added since 2006. The U.K. leads, with 870 offshore megawatts installed, and will add another 1,000 megawatts with its London Array project in the Thames Estuary. The European Wind Energy Association reports that 100,000 megawatts of offshore wind projects are currently proposed or in development in Europe.

With some 30,000 megawatts slated to come online in 2009, world wind generating capacity will likely exceed 150,000 megawatts at year’s end. While this addition would top the record year for wind in 2008, it comes nowhere close to what it might have been without the worldwide financial crisis. After considerable deceleration in 2009, wind energy growth is expected to regain momentum. Analysts project that total installed capacity, buoyed by renewable energy standards and other pro-wind policies, including those contained in economic stimulus packages in the United States, China, and elsewhere, will more than double by 2013.

What is not yet clear is whether the United States will simply concede its leadership of the wind industry and the potentially vast economic benefits that come with it to China. If the United States decided to reverse its slide into second place, regaining and sustaining the top position would require bold action on many fronts. One is a long-term extension of the federal Production Tax Credit (PTC), the main policy instrument that has driven U.S. wind power development. Although in 2009 the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act extended the PTC until 2012, an extension to 2020 would provide lenders, developers, and manufacturers with the confidence needed for long-term investments.

A second beneficial policy move would be to establish a strong national renewable portfolio standard (RPS ), a law requiring a certain share of electricity to come from renewable sources by a specified date. U.S. wind growth has been aided by state standards—29 states now have a mandatory RPS—but a robust national standard would help sustain rapid growth by attracting more investment capital and encouraging manufacturers to scale up U.S. operations.

The third initiative that would greatly facilitate U.S. wind growth is the accelerated upgrading and expansion of the nation’s electric grid. Transmission capacity in remote wind-rich areas cannot accommodate all the electricity that could be produced. Some 16 transmission development projects, with power lines able to accommodate 36,000 megawatts of new wind capacity, are in the pipeline and scheduled for completion by 2014. These projects are encouraging, but a far cry from what is needed to address the country’s huge transmission bottleneck—nearly 300,000 megawatts of wind projects under development are stuck in line, awaiting access to the grid.

Finally, putting a price on carbon would give wind yet another boost. Incorporating the climate costs of burning fossil fuels into electricity prices would make wind generated electricity much cheaper than electricity from coal, further enhancing wind’s appeal to investors.

The country leading the charge in wind energy development will reap enormous economic benefits as the world shifts from fossil fuels to renewable sources of electricity. As wind emerges as the centerpiece of the new energy economy, much is at stake in the battle for industry leadership, including millions of new jobs. With close to 300,000 megawatts of wind projects in queue and a sympathetic administration in the White House, the United States could regain its leadership role—if it chooses to do so.

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Data and additional resources at www.earthpolicy.org.


Media Contact:
Reah Janise Kauffman
E-mail: rjk (at) earthpolicy.org
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Tel: 202.496.9290 ext. 17

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Janet Larsen

http://www.earthpolicy.org/index.php?/plan_b_updates/2009/update85

Future firefighters have their work cut out for them. Perhaps nowhere does this hit home harder than in Australia, where in early 2009 a persistent drought, high winds, and record high temperatures set the stage for the worst wildfire in the country’s history. On February 9th, now known as “Black Saturday,” the mercury in Melbourne topped 115 degrees Fahrenheit (46.4 degrees Celsius) as fires burned over 1 million acres in the state of Victoria—destroying more than 2,000 homes and killing more than 170 people, tens of thousands of cattle and sheep, and 1 million native animals.

Even as more people move into fire-prone wildlands around the world, the intense droughts and higher temperatures that come with global warming are likely to make fires more frequent and severe in many areas. (See table of regional observations and predictions) For southeastern Australia, home to much of the country’s population, climate change could triple the number of extreme fire risk days by 2050.

Although fires typically make the news only when they grow large and put lives or property at risk, on any given day thousands of wildfires burn worldwide. Fire is a natural and important process in many ecosystems, clearing the land and recycling organic matter into the soil. Some 40 percent of the earth’s land is covered with fire-prone vegetation. A number of plants—such as giant Sequoia trees and certain prairie grasses—need fire to propagate or to create the right conditions for them to flourish.

Fire patterns have changed over time as human populations have grown and altered landscapes by clearing forests, allowing pasture animals to overgraze grasslands, and importing new plant species. Across parts of the western United States, for example, cheatgrass, an invasive annual adapted to frequent burns, has supplanted native brush, desert shrub, and perennial grasses that typically experience longer intervals between fires. In other areas, mixed-age and mixed-species forests have been replaced by single-species plantations where flames can jump easily from tree to tree. The result, instead of a low-intensity restorative fire, is a fire so hot that it can cause lasting harm to soils.

Humans have also altered fire patterns through deliberate suppression. After 1910, when a severe wildfire charred more than 3 million acres of western U.S. forest in just two days, the strong desire to protect timber resources gave life to a policy of quickly extinguishing fires. For decades firefighters proved remarkably successful in this endeavor, but the upshot was that forests became so loaded with fuel that a blaze that evaded control could quickly grow into a dangerous megafire.

Now policies are shifting in many places to let some fires proceed naturally or through preventative controlled burns; yet by warming the planet, we may be relinquishing even more control than we bargained for. Higher average global temperatures mean extremes are in store: even as climate change brings more flooding in some areas, other places will be plagued by droughts and extended heat waves. As the temperature rose between the 1970s and early 2000s, for instance, the share of total global land area experiencing very dry conditions doubled from less than 15 percent to close to 30 percent. A hotter, drier world burns more readily. Global warming could be pushing us into a new regime of larger, longer-burning, more intense fires as well as fires in places that historically have been hard to ignite, like moist tropical forests.

Already there is evidence of the connection between higher temperatures and wildfire. Anthony Westerling of Scripps Institution and colleagues found a marked uptick in forest fires in the western United States since the mid-1980s, with the wildfire season lengthening by 78 days over the last 15 years compared with the preceding 15 years. The fire season length and the duration of each fire rose in concert with regional spring and summer temperatures, which were an average 0.87 degrees Celsius higher in the later period. Higher temperatures are melting mountain snow cover earlier in the spring, leaving less moisture for the summer and giving fires a better chance to spread. And while human land use certainly has had a direct effect on wildfire patterns throughout the West, the biggest increase in U.S. wildfire frequency has actually occurred in the largely untouched mid-elevation Northern Rockies forests, implicating climate change.

Farther north, Alaska’s and Canada’s boreal forests recently have experienced more-frequent fires, releasing enough carbon to transform them in some years from net absorbers to net emitters. Between the 1960s and the 1990s, the total area burned more than doubled.  Higher temperatures have extended the range of the tree-damaging spruce budworm into new territory and allowed spruce beetles, no longer delayed by cold winters, to complete their typical two-year life cycle in just a single year. Drought has limited the efficacy of the trees’ defenses. Together the insects and the drought are leaving millions of acres of dead wood in their wake, providing fuel for wildfires. Overall, a warmer climate is predicted to double the area burned in northern Canada by 2100; in Alaska, the area could double by as early as 2050.

In other parts of the world fire regimes are changing and are projected to change even more as the planet heats up. Over much of Europe fire frequency decreased during most of the twentieth century, and expanding forests soaked up carbon.  Now, however, some areas may be starting to see more fires. Between 2000 and 2006, some 50,000 fires burned each year in the Mediterranean region, compared with 30,000 a year in the 1980s, though the total area burned did not increase, in part because of more vigilant firefighting.

During Europe’s record 2003 heat wave, which killed over 50,000 people, an estimated 650,000 hectares of forest burned continent-wide. Although the number of fires during this warm and dry year was not particularly high, the area burned was a record. More than 5 percent of Portugal's forest area burned, four times the 1980–2004 annual average, resulting in economic damages exceeding 1 billion euros. If future warming is not kept in check, hot and dry summers like 2003 could happen as frequently as every other year, dramatically increasing wildfire risk.

For Southeast Asia, the extreme 1997–98 El Niño brought a major drought to the region, allowing some of the most severe fires in recent history to burn in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Laos. Fires set to clear land jumped from grasslands and shrublands to logged forests and peat swamps, where they burned underground. For months Southeast Asian skies were hazy from smoke. Nearly 10 million hectares burned in Indonesia alone, affecting 23 of 27 provinces and costing more than $9 billion.

During that same El Niño, more than 20 million hectares burned in Latin America, wreaking damages of up to $15 billion. In 2001 the following El Niño brought more drought and put a frightening one third of Amazon forests at risk of burning. With a temperature rise of more than 3 degrees Celsius—well within the range projected for this century barring rapid and dramatic action to curb carbon emissions—much of South America is likely to see more frequent wildfires.

Just as a weakened immune system leaves a person vulnerable to otherwise innocuous germs, the combination of logging, road construction, and intentional burning to clear forests for cattle ranches, farms, and plantations has fragmented the world’s tropical forests, increasing their vulnerability to fire. Piling higher temperatures on top of such stresses could completely undermine forests’ resilience. For the massive Amazon rainforest, we risk reaching a tipping point where recurrent droughts dry out the landscape enough so that small fires can turn into devastating conflagrations.

We all rely on trees to soak up greenhouse gases and store carbon. If large swaths of forest go up in flames, it could set into motion a vicious cycle, where more wildfires in turn release more carbon into the atmosphere. Stabilizing climate, and doing so quickly, takes on a new urgency when it means averting an inferno on earth.

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Janet Larsen is the Director of Research for the Earth Policy Institute.

Media Contact:
Reah Janise Kauffman
E-mail: rjk@earthpolicy.org
Tel: 202.496.9290 ext. 12

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Tel: 202.496.9290 ext. 14

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The surprise Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, was a dramatic wakeup call. It totally changed how Americans thought about the war. If the American people had been asked on December 6th whether the country should enter World War II, probably 95 percent would have said no. By Monday morning, December 8th, perhaps 95 percent would have said yes.
 
The weakness of the Pearl Harbor model is that if we have to wait for a catastrophic event to change our behavior, it might be too late. It could lead to stresses that would themselves lead to social collapse. When scientists are asked to identify a possible “Pearl Harbor” scenario on the climate front, they frequently point to the possible breakup of the West Antarctic ice sheet. Relatively small blocks of it have been breaking off for more than a decade now, but huge parts of the sheet could break off, sliding into the ocean.
 
It is conceivable that this breakup could raise sea level a frightening two or three feet within a matter of years. Unfortunately, if we reach this point it may be too late to cut carbon emissions fast enough to save the remainder of the West Antarctic ice sheet or the Greenland ice sheet, whose melting is also accelerating. This is not the model we want to follow for social change on climate.

The Berlin Wall model is of interest because the wall’s dismantling 20 years ago, in November 1989, was a visual manifestation of a much more fundamental social change. At some point, the people living in Eastern Europe, buoyed by changes in Moscow, had rejected the great “socialist experiment” with its one-party political system and centrally planned economy. Although it was not anticipated, Eastern Europe experienced a political revolution, an essentially bloodless revolution, that changed the form of government in every country in the region. It had reached a tipping point, but it was not expected. You can search the political science journals of the 1980s in vain for an article warning that Eastern Europe was on the verge of a political revolution. In Washington the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) “had no idea in January 1989 that a tidal wave of history was about to break upon us,” reflected Robert Gates, formerly with the CIA and now U.S. Secretary of Defense, in a 1996 interview.

Many social changes occur when societies reach tipping points or cross key thresholds. Once that happens, change comes rapidly and often unpredictably. One of the best known U.S. tipping points is the growing opposition to smoking that took place during the last half of the twentieth century. This anti-smoking movement was fueled by a steady flow of information on the health-damaging effects of smoking, a process that began with the Surgeon General’s first report in 1964 on smoking and health. The tipping point came when this information flow finally overcame the heavily funded disinformation campaign funded by the tobacco industry.

Published almost every year, the Surgeon General’s report both drew attention to what was being learned about the effect of smoking on health and spawned countless new research projects on this relationship. There were times in the 1980s and 1990s when it seemed every few weeks another study was being released that had analyzed and documented one health effect or another associated with smoking. Eventually smoking was linked to more than 15 forms of cancer and to heart disease and strokes. As public awareness of the damaging effects of smoking on health accumulated, various measures were adopted that banned smoking on planes and in offices, restaurants, and other public places. As a result of these collective changes, cigarette smoking per person peaked around 1970 and began a long-term decline that continues today.

One of the defining events in this social shift came when the tobacco industry agreed to compensate state governments for past Medicare costs of treating smoking victims. More recently, in June 2009 Congress passed by an overwhelming margin and President Obama signed a bill that gave the Food and Drug Administration the authority to regulate tobacco products, including advertising. It opened a new chapter in the effort to reduce the health toll from smoking.

The sandwich model of social change is in many ways the most attractive one, partly because it brings a potential for rapid change. As of late 2009, the strong grassroots interest in cutting carbon emissions and developing renewable sources of energy is merging with the interests of President Obama and his administration. One result is a near de facto moratorium on building new coal plants.

There are many signs that the United States may be moving toward a tipping point on climate, much as it did on civil rights in the 1960s. Though some of the indicators also reflect the economic downturn, it now seems likely that carbon emissions in the United States peaked in 2007 and have begun what will be a long-term decline. The burning of coal and oil, the principal sources of carbon emissions, may  be declining. And with the cars to be scrapped in 2009 likely to exceed sales, the U.S. automobile fleet size may have peaked and begun to shrink.

The shift to more fuel-efficient cars over the last two years, spurred in part by higher gasoline prices, was strongly reinforced by the new automobile fuel efficiency standards and by rescue package pressures on the automobile companies to improve fuel efficiency. The combination of much more demanding automobile efficiency standards, a dramatic restoration of funding for public transit, and an encouraging shift not only to more fuel-efficient gas-electric hybrid cars but also to both plug-in hybrids and electric cars could dramatically reduce gasoline sales. The U.S. Department of Energy in past years had projected substantial growth in U.S. oil consumption, but it has recently revised this downward. The question now is not will oil use decline, but how fast will it do so.
 
Shifts within the energy sector, with rapid growth in wind and solar energy while coal and oil are declining, also signal a basic shift in values, one that could eventually alter every sector of the economy. If so, this, combined with a national leadership that shares these emerging values, could lead to social and economic change on a scale and at a pace we cannot now easily imagine.

Of the three models of social change, relying on the Pearl Harbor model is by far the riskiest, because by the time a society-changing catastrophic event occurs, it may be too late. The Berlin Wall model works, despite the lack of government support, but it does take time. Some 40 years elapsed after the communist takeover of the governments of Eastern Europe before the spreading opposition became strong enough to overcome repressive regimes and switch to democratically elected governments. The ideal situation for rapid, historic progress occurs when mounting grassroots pressure for change merges with a national leadership committed to the same change. This may help explain why the world has such high hopes for the new U.S. leadership.


Adapted from Chapter 10, “Can We Mobilize Fast Enough?” in Lester R. Brown, Plan B 4.0: Mobilizing to Save Civilization (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009), available on-line at www.earthpolicy.org.

Earth Policy Release

Lester R. Brown

Our early twenty-first century civilization is being squeezed between advancing deserts and rising seas. Measured by the biologically productive land area that can support human habitation, the earth is shrinking. Mounting population densities, once generated solely by population growth, are now also fueled by the relentless advance of deserts and may soon be affected by the projected rise in sea level. As overpumping depletes aquifers, millions more are forced to relocate in search of water.

Desert expansion in sub-Saharan Africa, principally in the Sahelian countries, is displacing millions of people—forcing them to either move southward or migrate to North Africa. A 2006 U.N. conference on desertification in Tunisia projected that by 2020 up to 60 million people could migrate from sub-Saharan Africa to North Africa and Europe. This flow of migrants has been under way for many years.

In mid-October 2003, Italian authorities discovered a boat bound for Italy carrying refugees from Africa. After being adrift for more than two weeks and having run out of fuel, food, and water, many of the passengers had died. At first the dead were tossed overboard. But after a point, the remaining survivors lacked the strength to hoist the bodies over the side. The dead and the living shared the boat, resembling what a rescuer described as “a scene from Dante’s Inferno.”

The refugees were believed to be Somalis who had embarked from Libya, but the survivors would not reveal their country of origin, lest they be sent home. We do not know whether they were political, economic, or environmental refugees. Failed states like Somalia produce all three. We do know that Somalia is an ecological disaster, with overpopulation, overgrazing, and the resulting desertification destroying its pastoral economy.

Perhaps the largest flow of Somali migrants is into Yemen, another failing state. In 2008 an estimated 50,000 migrants and asylum seekers reached Yemen, 70 percent more than in 2007. And during the first three months of 2009 the migrant flow was up 30 percent over the same period in 2008. These numbers simply add to the already unsustainable pressures on Yemen’s land and water resources, hastening its decline.

On April 30, 2006, a man fishing off the coast of Barbados discovered a 20-foot boat adrift with the bodies of 11 young men on board, bodies that were “virtually mummified” by the sun and salty ocean spray. As the end drew near, one passenger left a note tucked between two bodies: “I would like to send my family in Basada [Senegal] a sum of money. Please excuse me and goodbye.” The author of the note was apparently one of a group of 52 who had left Senegal on Christmas Eve aboard a boat destined for the Canary Islands, a jumping off point for Europe. They must have drifted for some 2,000 miles, ending their trip in the Caribbean. This boat was not unique. During the first weekend of September 2006, police intercepted boats from Mauritania with a record total of nearly 1,200 people on board.

For those living in Central American countries, including Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador, Mexico is often the gateway to the United States. In 2008, Mexican immigration authorities reported some 39,000 detentions and 89,000 deportations.

In the city of Tapachula on the Guatemala-Mexico border, young men in search of jobs wait along the tracks for a slow-moving freight train passing through the city en route to the north. Some make it onto the train. Others do not. The Jesús el Buen Pastor refuge is home to 25 amputees who lost their grip and fell under a train while trying to board. For these young men, says Olga Sánchez Martínez, the director of the refuge, this is the “end of their American dream.” A local priest, Flor María Rigoni, calls the migrants attempting to board the trains “the kamikazes of poverty.”

Today, bodies washing ashore in Italy, Spain, and Turkey are a daily occurrence, the result of desperate acts by desperate people. And each day Mexicans risk their lives in the Arizona desert trying to reach jobs in the United States. On average, some 100,000 or more Mexicans leave rural areas every year, abandoning plots of land too small or too eroded to make a living. They either head for Mexican cities or try to cross illegally into the United States. Many of those who try to cross the Arizona desert perish in its punishing heat. Since 2001, some 200 bodies have been found along the Arizona border each year.

With the vast majority of the 2.4 billion people to be added to the world by 2050 coming in countries where water tables are already falling, water refugees are likely to become commonplace. They will be most common in arid and semiarid regions where populations are outgrowing the water supply and sinking into hydrological poverty. Villages in northwestern India are being abandoned as aquifers are depleted and people can no longer find water. Millions of villagers in northern and western China and in parts of Mexico may have to move because of a lack of water.

Advancing deserts are squeezing expanding populations into an ever smaller geographic area. Whereas the U.S. Dust Bowl displaced 3 million people, the advancing desert in China’s Dust Bowl provinces could displace tens of millions.

Africa, too, is facing this problem. The Sahara Desert is pushing the populations of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria northward toward the Mediterranean. In a desperate effort to deal with drought and desertification, Morocco is geographically restructuring its agriculture, replacing grain with less thirsty orchards and vineyards.

In Iran, villages abandoned because of spreading deserts or a lack of water already number in the thousands. In the vicinity of Damavand, a small town within an hour’s drive of Tehran, 88 villages have been abandoned. And as the desert takes over in Nigeria, farmers and herders are forced to move, squeezed into a shrinking area of productive land. Desertification refugees typically end up in cities, many in squatter settlements. Others migrate abroad.

In Latin America, deserts are expanding and forcing people to move in both Brazil and Mexico. In Brazil, some 66 million hectares of land are affected, much of it concentrated in the country’s northeast. In Mexico, with a much larger share of arid and semiarid land, the degradation of cropland now extends over 59 million hectares.

While desert expansion and water shortages are now displacing millions of people, rising seas promise to displace far greater numbers in the future, given the concentration of the world’s population in low-lying coastal cities and rice-growing river deltas. The numbers could eventually reach the hundreds of millions, offering yet another powerful reason for stabilizing both climate and population.

In the end, the issue with rising seas is whether governments are strong enough to withstand the political and economic stress of relocating large numbers of people while suffering heavy coastal losses of housing and industrial facilities.

During this century we must deal with the effects of trends—rapid population growth, advancing deserts, and rising seas—that we set in motion during the last century. Our choice is a simple one: reverse these trends or risk being overwhelmed by them.


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Adapted from Chapter 2, “Population Pressure: Land and Water,” in Lester R. Brown, Plan B 4.0: Mobilizing to Save Civilization (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009), available on-line at www.earthpolicy.org/index.php?/books/pb4


Additional data and information sources at
http://www.earthpolicy.org/index.php?/book_bytes/2009/pb4ch02_ss7


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