The clock on the mantle began to chime.
Santa whispered to the clone, "It works every time."
With the clone by his side Santa said, "Goodnight. Merry Christmas, Mom, You'll be all right."

In some respects, it is understandable why violence against children has commanded more attention than neglect. Abuse often leaves visible bruises and scars, whereas the signs of neglect tend to be less visible. However, the effects of neglect can be just as detrimental. In fact, some studies have shown that neglect may be more detrimental to children’s early brain development than physical or sexual abuse.

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"Parental alienation," as defined by child psychiatrist

Richard M. Gardner, M.D., refers to:

". . . a disturbance in which children are preoccupied with

deprecation and criticism of a parent - denigration that is

unjustified and/or exaggerated. The notion that such

children are merely "brainwashed" is narrow. The term

brainwashing implies that one parent is systematically

and consciously programming the child to denigrate the

other. The concept of parental alienation syndrome

includes the brainwashing component, but is much more

inclusive. It includes not only conscious, but subconscious

and unconscious factors within the programming parent

that contribute to the child's alienation from the other.

Furthermore (and this is extremely important), it

includes factors that arise within the child -

independent of the parental contributions - that play

a role in the development of the syndrome. In addition,

situational factors may contribute, i.e., factors that

exist in the family and the environment that may play a

role in bringing about the disorder." (Gardner, The

Parental Alienation Syndrome and the Differentiation

Between Fabricated and Genuine Child Sex Abuse (1987,

Creative Therapeutics)

When a parent is accused of child abuse or child molest and

the accused parent claims that he has not abused or molested the

child and that he has done nothing else to cause the child to

against a parent is relevant to establish a motive for the child

to fear, hate, and be biased against the accused parent, thereby

testifying falsely against him.

The existence or non-existence of a bias, interest or motive

to falsify is relevant to and may be used to attack the

credibility of a witness. (Evidence Code §210; Evidence Code

§780(f); CALJIC 2.20; People v. Allen (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 924,

931.) Such bias, interest or motive may be established on crossexamination

or by extrinsic proof. (People v. James (1976) 56

Cal.App.3d 876, 886.) Defense counsel should be allowed wide

latitude in developing facts which show bias or interest of a

Expert testimony explaining parental alienation and its

application in a given situation has been admitted in numerous

cases both in California and elsewhere. (See Coursey v. Superior

Court (Coursey) (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 147 [in visitation dispute,

expert testimony from therapist admitted at trial that child in

question suffered from parental alienation syndrome and therefore

did not want to visit with father]; In re Violetta 568 N.E.2d

1345 (1991 Ill.) [in case involving propriety of child's

placement in foster home, expert testimony on parental alienation

syndrome admitted]; Karen B. v. Clyde M. 574 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1991)

[in custody battle, following unsubstantiated allegations of

father's sexual abuse of daughter, expert testimony on parental

alienation syndrome admitted at trial and court found that

mother likely programmed the child to accuse her father of molest

so mother could have sole custody of child]; In re John W. (1996)

41 Cal.App.4th 961 [in dependency case involving unsubstantiated

allegations of child molest, expert testimony on parental

alienation syndrome admitted to show what mother had done to

child]; Marriage of Condon (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 533 [expert

testimony on parental alienation syndrome admitted at trial in

move-away case]; White v. White (1999) 655 N.E.2d 523 (Ind.App.

syndrome admitted at trial].)

The admissibility of expert testimony on parental alienation

is compelled by People v. Phillips (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 69 and

People v. McDonald (1984) 37 Cal.3d 351.

Phillips involved an appeal by a woman convicted of

murdering one adopted daughter and endangering the life of the

other. In order to suggest a motive to the jury in a case where

the defendant's conduct was otherwise inexplicable, the

prosecution was allowed to present the expert testimony of a

psychiatrist concerning Munchausen's Syndrome by Proxy.

The defense appealed on the grounds that the introduction of

evidence of motive was inadmissible and that the evidence was

unreliable because the witness had not interviewed the defendant,

used only other people's literature to form his opinion since he

had never treated anyone with "Munchausen Syndrome By Proxy", and

the fact that it is not listed as a form of mental illness in

American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical

Manual of Mental Disorders. The reviewing court rejected each of

these arguments. (Id., at pp. 84-88.) The court's discussion of

these issues supports the admission of expert testimony of

parental alienation in this case:

"Admissibility of psychiatric evidence by the

prosecution where defendant has not made her mental

state an issue. Appellant suggests this may be the

'first time in the history of California criminal

jurisprudence in which the prosecution was permitted to

put into evidence, as part of its case in chief, the

mental condition of the defendant without the issue

first being raised either by plea or by the

introduction of the defendant's state of mind as part

of the defense.' That may be true, but it is hardly

persuasive as to the admissibility of such testimony.

While a prosecutor ordinarily need not prove motive as

an element of a crime (People vs. Durrant (1897) 116

Cal. 179, 208, 48 P. 65; People vs. Planagan (1944) 65

Cal.App.2d 371, 402, 150 P.2d 927), the absence of

apparent motive may make proof of the essential

elements less persuasive (People vs. Beagle (1972) 6

Cal.3d 441, 450, 99 Cal.Rptr. 313, 492 P.2d 1).

Clearly that was the principal problem confronting the

prosecutor here. In the absence of a motivational

hypothesis, and in the light of other information which

the jury had concerning her personality and character,

the conduct ascribed to appellant was incongruous and

apparently inexplicable. As both parties recognize,

Dr. Blinder's testimony was designed to fill that gap.

The evidence was thus relevant, and therefore

admissible '[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute'

(Evid. Code, Sec. 351). Appellant points to no

statutory provision which would preclude the prosecutor

from introducing otherwise admissible psychiatric

testimony relevant to motivation on the ground that the

defendant had not placed his or her mental state in

issue.

Appellant relies on People vs. Nicholas (1967) 65

Cal.2d 866, 880, 56 Cal.Rptr. 635, 423 P.2d 787, as

standing for the proposition that such evidence should

not be permitted. That case and its predecessor, In re

Spencer (1965) 63 Cal.2d 400, 412, 46 Cal.Rptr. 753,

406 P.2d 33, involved the constitutional issues posed

when a court-appointed psychiatrist is permitted to

testify to incriminating statements made to him by the

defendant in the course of the psychiatric interview.

Dr. Blinder never interviewed defendant, and

consequently no such constitutional issue is implicated

here.

Evidence Code Section 801 describes the boundaries of

expert testimony: `If a witness is testifying as an

expert, his testimony in the form of an opinion is

limited to such an opinion as is: (a) Related to a

subject that is sufficiently beyond common experience

that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of

fact; and (b) Based on matter (including his special

knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education)

perceived by or personally known to the witness or made

known to him at or before the hearing, whether or not

admissible, that is of a type that reasonably may be

relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the

subject to which his testimony relates, unless an

expert is precluded by law from using such matter as a

basis for his opinion.' Testimony outside these

boundaries, i.e., `testimony in the form of an opinion

that is based in whole or in significant part on matter

subject to exclusion upon objection. (Evid. Code

Section 803.)

The existence, nature, validity, and applicability of

these facts of the phenomenon characterized as

`Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy' are all matters

sufficiently beyond common experience that expert

opinion would assist the trier of fact, and appellant

does not argue otherwise. Thus, the requirements of

subdivision (a) of section 801 are satisfied. It is

the provisions of subdivision (b) that form the focus

of appellant's attack.

Under the provisions of subdivision (b), the fact that

Dr. Blinder's testimony was based in large measure upon

reports by others rather than upon his personal

observations of the defendant or of other persons

displaying that syndrome may affect the weight of his

testimony but does not render that testimony

inadmissible if those reports meet the standard of

reasonable reliability. (See Jefferson, California

Evidence Benchbook (1972) Sec. 29.4, 507-509; cf.

People vs. Brekke (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 651, 661-662,

58 Cal.Rptr. 854.)

All of the studies cited by Dr. Blinder appeared in

professional technical journals (cf. Luque vs.McLean

(1972) 8 Cal.3d 136, 148, 104 Cal.Rptr. 443, 501 P.2d

1163) and were written by medical specialists on the

basis of personal observations. 'While a layman may

not testify to a fact which he has learned only by

reading a medical book, there is no question that a

professional physician may rely upon medical texts as

the basis for his testimony. [Citations.]' (Brown vs.

Colm (1974) 11 Cal.3d 639, 644, 114 Cal.Rptr. 128, 522

P.2d 688.)

Appellant does not question Dr. Blinder's

qualifications to appraise the reliability of these

studies, nor does she suggest that information

contained in them could feasibly have been presented

except through the reported data. (Ibid.) Indeed, she

does not directly question the trustworthiness of these

studies at all, or the accuracy of Dr. Blinder's

interpretation of them to the jury. Rather, she rests

upon the proposition that Munchausen's syndrome by

proxy is an 'unrecognized illness...not generally

accepted by the medical profession,' and points to the

fact that the syndrome is not listed or discussed as a

form of mental illness in the American Psychiatric

Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of

Mental Disorders.

We are aware of no such requirement. We are not

developed by some new scientific technique such as

voiceprint identification. (cf. People vs. Kelly (1976)

17 Cal.3d 24, 30-32, 130 Cal.Rptr. 144, 549 P.2d 1240),

nor with conflict within the scientific community. In

People vs. Jackson (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 504, 507, 95

Cal.Rptr. 919, the court referred to the `battered

child syndrome' as an `accepted medical diagnosis' on

the basis of medical literature not unlike that

presented here. The studies here show intentional

poisoning of infants by their mothers to be another

form of child abuse. In the absence of some reason to

doubt their validity, we find no abuse of discretion in

the trial court's decision to allow expert testimony

based thereon."

People v. McDonald, supra, concerned the admissibility of

expert testimony on psychological factors affecting the accuracy

of eyewitness identification testimony. The California Supreme

Court held that expert testimony which simply informs the jury of

certain psychological factors that may impair the accuracy of

eyewitness identifications "falls well within the broad statutory

description of 'any matter that has any tendency in reason' to

bear on the credibility of a witness." (Id., at p. 366.) This

type of testimony concerns matters sufficiently beyond common

experience so that it can assist the trier of fact, and thus

passes the test of Evidence Code §801. (Id, at p. 369.) The

McDonald court also noted that in a sex case, "expert medical

testimony may be admitted to impeach the credibility of the

complaining witness by showing that he suffers from a particular

mental disorder that impairs his ability to tell the truth."

(Id., at p. 370.) The expert testimony sought to be admitted

here concerning certain psychological factors that affect a child

witness's ability to perceive, recollect and communicate, in

other words, memory, and influence his or her biases and motives

is no different than the testimony approved in McDonald. Other

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cases involving sex offenses have approved the use of expert

psychological testimony admitted for similar purposes. (E.g.,

People v. Stoll (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1136 [testimony concerning rape

trauma syndrome]; People v. Gray (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 213

[psychological testimony concerning traits or characteristics of

children who have been subjected to sexual abuse admissible as

akin to testimony informing the jury of factors that can affect